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'Technology transfer' has quite suddenly become fashionable.
It may be that after a long stagnation in the volume of official
capital aid, there are pressures to find other ways in which the
advanced countries can assist development - or even political
pressures to show how much the advanced countries are actually
doing - even if official credits have hardly groni at all.
Developing countries generally want rapid industrialization - and
practically by definition, this means they must get access to
acquired technical knowledge and existing technology. So, from
this point of view the transfer cf technology is apparently a 'good
thing'. It is a good thing also because far from being a burden
on the advanced country balance of payments, technology transfers
actually earn foreign exchange. The best of all possible worlds
indeed.
Or is it? Thè univalent views of the advantages of the
transfer of technology - as well as the innumerable proposals about
how to 'stimulate' it - generally beg the very questions that
should be asked in any serious diagnosis. This would not matter
too much if it were not that even a preliminary look at what the
'transfer of technology' really is, and at the way it is carried
out, raises serious doubts as to whether the right policy is to
'stimulate' transfer tout court. It is easy to agree that techno-
logy transfers - as they happen at present - are good for the
foreign exchange reserves of the industrialized countries. The
question is: are they good for development?
The transfer of technology covers the transfer from advanced
to developing countries of the elements of technical know-how
which are normally required in setting up ami operating new produc-
tion facilities and which are usually in very short supply (or
totally absent) in the developing economies. The elements of
know-how include such things as know-how for conducting feasibility
ana market studies, know-how for choosing technologies and for
engineering design and plant construction - as well as the imow-how
which is embodied in the production process itself. This latter
kind - which is called process know-how - is sometimes patented
or at least kept secret by the companies which possess it, Process
know-how probably gets most attention in the literature on transfer




of technology. At the same time, however, the transfer of
technology froto advanced to under-developed countries involves
f ar more than exchanges of patented process Imow-how0 The techno-
logical dependence of the developing countries stems not only from
their incapacity to invent new processes and products but also from
lack of other, possibly more mundane skills and capacilities, in
areas like engineering design, choice of techniques, management
and marketing0
On the face of it, enterprises in under-developed countries
should be able to acquire the various kinds of technical know-how
required in the construction and operation phases of a new project,
through direct arrangements with consultants, individuals, plant
construction companies, machinery produces and the like. Since
these groups and individuals operate in more or less competitive
markets, the recipient enterprise should benefit from the
competitive prices they charge for their services.
In practice, however, it is probably rather seldom that the
recipient enterprises arrange technology transfers in this way.
Most transfer of technology - at least in the capitalist part of
the world economy - involve an intermediary: an enterprise in the
advanced countries, which so to say, supplies a part (usually a
major part) of the technical knowledge which is required in a
vpackaget. The intermediary company is sometimes simply a
contracting group. More often it is a company engaged iii the kind
of production activities which are to be transferred. It arranges
the supply of know-how either from its own resources, or by sub-
contracting consultants and machine suppliers etc., or by a
mixture of both.
Most of the problems in technology transfer arise precisely
because of the predominance of 'indirecte transfer mechanisms -
involving intermediary companies. There are two questions about
the indirect mechanisms which need to be explored. The first
is why indirect mechanisms are used at all: in other words, what
caused the recipient companies to use these methods of transfer?
The second question concerns the incentives and motivations of the
'intermediary' companies: why do they get involved?
There are at least three factors which account for the
importance of indirect mechanisms for technology transfer.
In the first place, the problem for enterprises in the under-
developed countries is not simply to get the advice and technical
knowledge they need in order to set up and operate new production
facilities. It is also - and this may often be more important -
to put the advice and the knowledge to use in an economically
effective way. In order to do this the technology receiving
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company muet have, for example, the managerial and entrepreneurial
ability to make decisions on the basis of feasibility and engin-
eering studies. It must be able, also, to organise the various
experts, consultant groups, machine suppliers and plant construc-
tors that are involved in the construction phase - particularly
in those cases where these suppliers of technical knowledge are
independent of one another0 In other words over and above the
basic problem of getting a supply of technical knowledge, there is
the problem of developing the capacity to use the knowledge once
it is available. It is precisely these corporate skills which are
very frequently lacking in enterprises in the under-developed
economies0 Because of these deficiencies recipient enterprises
often have strong incentives to rely on the intermediary role of
production companies in the advanced countries, which demonstrably
possess these capabilities.
Second, this tendency appears to be re-inforced in those cases
where the process technology which is transferred is in private
ownership - for example, where it is patented. If, as is often
the case, the process technology is highly differentiated the
recipient company will have little choice and little incentive
but to enter contractual agreement for the whole transfer process,
with the process supplier. The supplier will sub-contract its
machine-supplier and plant constructors to install the new produc-
tien facilities.
third, the tendency is also re-inforced where the recipient
company is essentially seeking rights to the brand-names and
trademarks of the supplier. Given that the supplier often has
incentives to control the transfer, and sometimes subsequent
production activities as well, he may well make wide-ranging
contractual control over much of the transfer operation0
These three factors account for the fact that so many techno-
logy transfers are in fact carried out by various contractual
agreements, involving production companies in the advanced countries.
Direct investments to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries are one such
form of transfer. Licensing agreements - sometimes involving
equity participation and sometimes not - are another.
In competitive relationships, technological advantages are
generally the source of quasi-monopoly power to the companies which
have them. Unique possession of technology, for example, to
manufacture a new or highly differentiated product, is the source
of increased profits in imperfect markets, though this may of
course be a transitory phenomenon rather like Schumpeter's
'entrepreneurial' profit. Looked at from this point of view, the?intermediary companies in technology transfer operations - in
so far as they have differentiated process technologies to offer
6.
(or other sources of differentiation such as brand-names) - are
essentially seeking to reap the benefits of their competitive
advantages in the markets of the under-developed country. They
could, and often do, attempt to do this by exporting products.
However, transferring prcduction in various ways frequently is a
more attractive proposition because the domestic markets of the
under-developed countries are so often protected.
Protection appears to stimulate transfers of technology in
three main ways.
First, when protective barriers are raised, foreign enterprises
will have an incentive to transfer production into the under-
developed country as a means of market-defence.
Second, once the transfer has taken place, the 'technological
monopoly of the supplying company may be reinforced by 'insti-
tutional monopoly' arising from the imperfection of industrial
markets in under-developed countries.1 These markets are too small
to support many producers for any given commodity: whilst small
markets are not advantageous per se, monopolistic control of a small
market may be so.
Third, the barriers to entry in the under-developed country's
market, may well keep out competition for long periods. The
supplying company may be able to extend the period of quasi-
monopoly conferred by technological advantages.
The institutional set-up in which technology transfer actually
takes place, leads to a number of negative consequences. Most of
these negative aspects arise because intermediary companies natur-
ally use their technological monopolies to best advantage from
their own point of view. These are, of course, constraints on
what they can do, but by and large these do not seem to have been
very effective. In consequence, many technology agreements have
aspects which have anti-developmental consequences. Amongst the
most important restrictive clauses in transfer agreements are:-
(±) clauses which limit sales of the new product to the domestic
markets of the under-developed country itself. These clauses often
reflect the strategic requirements of the multinational companies
which predominate in many transfer operations. They are designed
to prevent competition in third markets.
1 The work of Vaitsos is relevant in this respect. (See elsewhere
in this issue, ed.)
(ii) clauses which tie the recipient company to the technology-
supplier, for supplies of equipment and intermediate goods.
There are other problems beyond the explicit application of
restrictions0 One such problem is that the very conditions which
stimulate transfers in the first place (i.e. protection of the
domestic market in under-developed countries) also lead to high
cost, uncompetitive production. Export restrictions in transfer
agreements are often an unnecessary precaution, because the reci-
pient enterprise is anyway uncompetitive in international markets.
This must to some extent account for the fact that technology
transf ers have not had much impact on the export position of under-
developed countries in manufactured goods.
The fact that supplying companies make transfers partly
because there are highly imperfect markets to exploit in the under-
developed country, has wider implications. In particular, it may
be that technology transfer operations tend to perpetuate irrational
and inefficint use of scarce investible resources.
And finally, there is the problem of choice and adaptation
of technology, which currently receives a great deal of attention
in discussions of the unemployment problem'. The mechanisinsthat
are actually employed to transfer technology probably limit the
possibilities of making a choice of technology in any given line of
production. And given the control which the technology supplier
exerts over the recipient, the possibilities of technological
adaptations are probably rather small. The supplier company has
to weigh the opportunity costs of using its scientists and techni-
cians to produce adapted techniques, instead of using them in the
hunt for innovations which will help to sustain competitive
advantages in industrialised markets. The private calculations
of supplier companies generally seem to work cut against adaptation.
Our main pre-occupation has been to throw some doubts on
simplistic approaches to a newly fashionable subject. Policies
for technology transfer need to do a good deal more than simply
'stimulate' the kind of activity which is in process.
A number of the problems associated with transfer operations
seem to arise because import-substitution policies are broad and
indiscriminating, and transfer operations might well have more
positive effects on export promotion if protection policies were
more selective. In any case, there are serious doubts about the
developmental value of many of the products manufactured by means
of transferred technology. An effective policy on technological
transfer really implies more clearly defined policies on consumption.
These, however, appear to be hard to achieve, and an inexhaustible
source of political difficulties,
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